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A Price-Support  Program  for
Farm  Commodities
By C. B.  Ratchford,  H. B. James, arnd R. E. Freund
Our understanding  was that the purpose  of  this  session  was
to stimulate  the thinking  of those  attending  the  conference,  the
specific  objective being  to learn  more about  the subject of price
supports.  To  accomplish this objective  we have  decided  to  pre-
sent,  as  a  basis  for  discussion,  a  price-support  program, for  the
United States.  We realize,  of course,  that the program has many
weaknesses,  but we  believe  that  a critical  appraisal  of  our  pro-
posal  will  do  more  to stimulate  thinking  and  facilitate  learning
than anything we could have prepared  for this session.
The paper, in its present  form,  is not suitable for use  in edu-
cational  work  on  public  policy  with  farm  people;  however,  it
should  provide useful material for those who are  responsible  for
developing  public policy material  to  be  used  with farm  people.
This program is not suggested  with the idea that any part of
it would ever be incorporated into actual price-support  laws.  We
do think, however, that the program points out many of the prob-
lems with which  a price  support program  must deal. The  prob-
lems  are brought  into sharp,  clear  focus  when efforts  are  made
to design a program  which satisfactorily resolves  these problems.
For this reason  a program  is presented  rather  than a discussion
of generalities  and principles.
This paper is divided into three main sections:  (1)  the func-
tions  of  price  supports,  (2)  a  suggested  program,  and  (3)  an
appraisal  of  the program.
Many significant details of the suggested program are omitted
partially because  of time and space limitations,  and also because
they would  tend to obscure  the major elements  of  the program.
FUNCTIONS  OF  PRICE  SUPPORTS
The  functions  of  prices  in an  economy  are:  (1)  to allocate
resources  among  the  many  alternative  sources  of  employment
and  (2)  to distribute the total income to owners of the resources.
In a dynamic economy  the supply of  and demand  for the many
factors and products are constantly changing. Prices must change
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not  perform  the  two  functions  in  a  manner  that  is  satisfactory
to  all  individuals  and  groups.  Farmers  have  been  particularly
dissatisfied with the result of free prices and have requested  price
supports.
Several peculiar characteristics  of farm production  and  mar-
keting which can be  identified are  responsible  for free prices  not
being satisfactory to many farmers. We will also argue that these
same  characteristics  cause  free prices  to act in a manner that  is
not  always in the public  interest. What are  these characteristics?
CHARACTERISTICS  OF  DEMAND.  The  demand  for most  farm
products  is  extremely  inelastic.  Most  studies  indicate  that  the
price  elasticity of many important  farm products  is about -0.2.
The  elasticity  for  beef,  which  has  the  highest  elasticity  of  the
major farm products,  is  only about -0.7.  The  inelastic demand
means  that  a  small  change  in  supply,  assuming  the  demand
schedule  does  not  shift,  causes  a  sharp  change  in  price.  For  a
commodity with a price  elasticity of -0.2,  a  10 percent  increase
in quantity results in a  50 percent  decrease in prices.  Also  when
demand  is  inelastic,  the  gross  income  declines  as  volume  in-
creases. Production costs, particularly the harvesting and market-
ing costs, increase as the size  of the crop increases.  Hence, net in-
come  is usually reduced sharply as the size  of the crop increases.
Low net incomes in years  of abundant  production  are one reason
farmers are dissatisfied with free market prices.  (There is appar-
ently  a  high  correlation  between  the  elasticity  of  demand  of  a
commodity and the demand on the part of producers of the com-
modity for  price  supports.)
Exports  deserve  special  mention  since  they  represent  a  seg-
ment  of demand  which is  subject,  to a large  extent,  to  the dic-
tates of our own government and  of foreign governments.  In no
sense  can world  trade  be  called free  any more.  If the  export  of
farm  commodities  is  in  the  interest  of  this  country,  then  the
country  as  a  whole,  not  just  farmers,  should  assume  the  risk  of
producing  for the export  market.
CHARACTERISTICS  OF  SUPPLY.  Farmers do not have  complete
control  over supply.  Weather,  which is beyond the farmer's  con-
trol,  can  cause  wide  variations  in supply.  Producers  often make
errors in their estimate of the demand  schedule, and demand  can
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are  practically  powerless  to  adjust  producton  to  the  changed
demand  once  a  production  cycle  is  underway.  Farmers  have
watched  industry  adjust  production  quickly  when  it has  made
an error  in its  estimates  and  prices threaten  to fall  or when  de-
mand  changes.  Since  a  high  proportion  of  industrial  costs  are
variable,  industry  often finds  it more profitable  to close down or
curtail  production  than  to  accept  a  low  price  for  its  product.
The nature of agricultural  production  and the fact  that a small
share of total costs are variable dictate that the individual farmer
continue to produce  even  at very low prices.  Hence,  farmers are
seeking  protection  from  the  price  drops  associated  with  errors
in predicting  demand,  a changed  demand,  or changes  in supply
which  are  beyond  their  control.
CHARACTERISTICS  OF  AGRICULTURAL  PRICES.  The  character-
istics  of  supply  and  demand  for  agricultural  commodities  are
such  that farm  prices  can  and  do  fluctuate  widely  when  their
free  play  is  uninterrupted.  In  addition,  changes  in  the  level  of
economic  activity  in  the  nation  may  cause  violent  changes  in
farm prices.  Historically,  farm  prices  have behaved  much more
erratically  than  have  other  prices  during  rapid  swings  in  the
business  cycle.
If the price mechanism is to be used to allocate  resources and
distribute income,  conditions  must be  such,  and  prices  must be-
have  in  such  a  way  that this  objective  is  accomplished.  To be
sure,  free prices can allocate resources and distribute  income, but
not in a manner satisfactory  to American  farmers. The  destruc-
tion  of capital,  soil  erosion,  and bankruptcy  as  a  result  of  free,
erratic,  and  low farm prices  may be  one way  to reallocate  farm
resources,  but this process is not the only way to reallocate  farm
resources.  Nor can  one  even  agree that it  is  a  satisfactory  way.
Less  destructive,  less  painful,  and  less  expensive  ways  of reallo-
cating  farm  resources  can be  found.
THE  PROGRAM
The authors kept several ideas in mind as they developed the
program.
First,  we  conceived  of  a price-support  program  as  a  device
built  into  the  free  market  price  system  in such  a  way that the
program would  not  deprive  prices  of their  primary function  of
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is that it would smooth out erratic  price fluctuations,  and in this
way make prices serve their allocative  and  distributive functions,
even  better  than  if  there  were  no  price  supports,  by  reducing
price  and  income  uncertainties.
Second, it was recognized, however,  that at some danger point
in  the  supply  and  demand  situation  for  either  particular  com-
modities,  or  the  agricultural  economy  as  a  whole,  production
controls  must  be  resorted  to.  Such  controls  do  introduce  some
element  of  monopoly,  and in view of  our value  judgments  may
rightly be deemed  undesirable.  We feel, however,  that the value
judgments  of farmers  and the enlightened  public are  such  that
they will not  tolerate  distressed  conditions  without  doing  some-
thing about  them.  Farmers  are  likely  to  act  in self-defense  and
try to  prevent extreme  price  fluctuations  through  some  form  of
"private"  control,  which  may become  a  fixed  monopoly  part  of
the  picture  even  under  "normal"  conditions.  Under  such  cir-
cumstances  government  controls may seem  preferable  to private
action though the danger of political pressure to perpetuate these
controls  in favor  of special  farmer  groups must be  recognized.
Third, the program was  kept as  simple  as  possible.  It is rec-
ognized,  however,  that all  phases of the program  are not simple.
Indeed,  a  really  simple  program  probably  will  not  work.
Fourth, it  was  accepted  that any  program which  really  sup-
ports prices  will cost  money  and  will have  to be  financed  out of
either  tax  money,  or  consumer  expenditures,  or  both.  There  is
no such thing  as  a  "self-financing"  price-support  program.  The
real question is  whether  a particular  program  will cost more,  or
less,  than alternative  programs.
Scope and  Principles  of the  Proposed  Program
The purpose of this section  is to present a brief outline of the
program before we move into the details.
Our proposal  deals  with price  supports  for  perishable  farm
commodities,  but  it applies  as  well  to  the  so-called  "basic"  or
"storable"  farm  commodities.  In fact,  we  believe  that the  dis-
tinction  between  "basics"  and  "nonbasics,"  as  well  as  that  be-
tween  "storables"  and  "nonstorables"  makes  little  economic
sense.  Some  nonbasic  commodities  are  fully  as  storable  as  the
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form, even  though it is true that they would not for long remain
useful  for human  consumption  in  their original  form.
The suggested  program  provides  price  supports  for all  farm
products.  Questions  will  undoubtedly  be raised  as  to  the advis-
ability  of  supporting  all  farm  products.  The  authors  could  not
find  a  logical  place  to stop,  however.  A line  could  logically  be
drawn  on  either  elasticity  of  demand  or  importance  of  a  com-
modity  to the national interest.  If a commodity has  an elasticity
of  unity or greater,  there  is  no  need  for price  supports.  We  do
not know of any agricultural  commodity,  however,  with an  elas-
ticity of  unity or greater.  A  review  of  price-support  experience
for  the last  twenty  years  reveals  that under  a  program  where
all commodities  are  not automatically  covered,  many  commodi-
ties  which  are  of  little  importance  to  either  the  bulk  of  the
farmers  or  to  society  receive  price-support  benefits  while  many
important commodities  do  not receive  supports.
Flexible  price supports  are suggested.  An effort  was made  to
make  the  price  supports  flexible  enough  so  that  over  a  period
of  time  and  when  full  employment  prevails  the free  forces  of
supply  and  demand  will  be  able  to clear  the  market.  In some
years, however,  the support prices will likely not clear the market.
When they do clear the market,  a program would not be needed
or would be  ineffective.
Different  methods  and  approaches  are  necessary  depending
on special supply and  demand conditions prevailing during  par-
ticular periods. We distinguish two such conditions and periods-
full  employment  and  depression.
(1)  Under  conditions  of  full  employment,  we  expect  the
market forces to take care of most of the price fluctuations with-
out undue  stress  on  the farm  sector.  Consequently,  we  propose
a wide  range  of support  levels,  say,  between  60 and 90  percent
of parity, as defined by the Agricultural  Acts of  1948  and  1949.'
1Parity  is  computed  under  these  Acts  as  follows:
(a)  Divide  the  average  price  received  by  farmers  for  each  commodity  for  the
last  ten  years  by the  average  of  the  index  numbers  of  all  prices  received  by  farmers
(base  1910-14).  This  gives  the  so-called  "adjusted"  base  price  for each  commodity,
and  is  a fictitious  price  which  was  not paid  to farmers  in  the  base  period,  or  at  any
time.
(b)  Multiply  the  "adjusted"  base price  with the  index  number of all prices  paid
by farmers,  including  interest,  taxes,  and  wages  paid  to  hired  labor,  as  of  the  month
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livestock,  will be determined  by the  anticipated  sales  volume  of
the year during which that support price is in effect.  This antici-
pated  sales volume  will  be  translated  into  a  "national  acreage"
or "number"  figure by using the average yield  of the five preced-
ing years for conversion.  The national figures  will not be  broken
down  into  state,  county,  and  individual  farm  allotments;  they
are  somewhat  in  the  nature  of  the  over-all  "goals"  which  the
USDA has  published  annually.
Support  levels  would  change  from  one  year  to the next  in-
versely,  and  roughly  proportionately,  to  the  amount  of  under-
planting or overplanting  of crops, underbreeding  or overbreeding
of  livestock,  and  to  prospective  changes  in  demand.  Farmers
would  be  expected,  then,  as  a  group,  to adjust  their  production
bases in response to the changes in the support price level.  Under
conditions  of full employment,  we  do not  expect  the  changes  in
the support price level due to demand changes  to be of a disturb-
ing nature.
When  the  price  for  a  particular  commodity  falls  below  the
75 percent  parity level,  production  controls  would seem to be  in
order,  if  producers  want  them.  These  would  take  the  form  of
individual  farm  marketing  quotas  (instead  of  acreage  or num-
ber  allotments)  established  under  referendum  provisions  as  we
have  them now.  Support  prices  could  then be  adjusted  upward
if farmers  agreed  to  reduce  production  accordingly.  Individual
marketing  quotas  would  be  made  transferable.
(2)  When  a  depression  hits  the  country,  support  prices
would  be  frozen  for  the  duration  of  the  depression  at  the  per-
centages  of  the  parity price  level  that  prevailed  before  the  de-
pression.  This means that support prices  would retain their rela-
tionships  to each  other,  even though actual support  prices  could
change  as parity changes.
Under  both  of  the  conditions  and  periods,  price  supports
would  operate through  the market  and  the market  price.  That
for  which  parity is  computed.  This  gives  the  parity price  of  100  percent,  from which
the  support  levels  are  computed.
It  is  recognized that the parity formula  has many defects,  the main  one being that
it very  imperfectly  reflects  current  demand  and production  conditions.  We  feel  that
permitting  prices  to  flex  over  a  wide  range  overcomes  many  of  the  objections  to  the
parity  formula.  We  would  have  no  objections  to  a  new  parity  formula,  and  a  new
parity formula would not likely  change the  major provisions  of the  suggested  program.
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part  of the output which  would not be  taken  by the market  at
the support  price.
The  salient  features  of  this  proposal  will  stand  out  more
clearly  when  we  embark  on  a  discussion  of  its  most important
points. For this purpose  we shall again adhere  to our distinction
between  periods  of  full  employment  and  those  of  distress  con-
ditions.
Price Supports  Under Full  Employment  Conditions
THE  RANGE  OF  SUPPORT  PRICES. We propose that price sup-
ports  shall  vary  between  60  and  90  percent  of  parity,  for  all
farm  commodities  with the exception  of citrus  fruit,  to which  a
range  of between  27  and  40  percent  of  parity would  apply.
Sixty percent was set as a minimum for the following reasons:
(1)  It is low  enough during periods of full employment to  allow
the market  to  clear  except  when  yield  is  abnormally  high.  On
the other hand,  it is low enough not  to interfere  with  the differ-
ential  that  the market  establishes  for  the various  commodities.
Over the last six years prices of major commodities,  except citrus
fruit,  have  seldom  gone  below  60  percent  of  parity  (Table  1).
(2)  Prices of 60 percent  of parity will  enable farmers with  aver-
age efficiency  to realize  out-of-pocket  costs.  On the  other hand,
60 percent  is low  enough to encourage  a  decrease  in production
for at least  some  farmers,  i.e.,  marginal  producers.  (3)  Even  if
60  percent  is  not  low enough  to effect  the  correct  allocation  of
resources,  farmers  will  not likely  accept  a lower  level.
It is more difficult  to justify 90  percent  as  a maximum.  The
maximum  was  set  at this  level,  however,  as  we  are  concerned
with  minimum  prices  and not  with  maximum  prices.  If  price
ceilings were also involved, more attention would need to be given
to the top level.
The  lower  levels  of supports  for  citrus  fruit  is  based  on  the
fact  that the citrus  fruit industry  experienced  a decided  change
in  production  and  processing  methods,  which  resulted  in  con-
tinuously  lower price  levels after World War  II. This structural
change  would  require  that  a  different  base  period  than  that  of
1910-14 should be  established;  we did not do  so, but simply  ad-
justed the level of the support range downward,  which has about
the same  effect  as computing  a new  base period for  citrus  fruit.
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the  exact  level  of  the annual  support  price  will  depend  on  the
supply  and  demand  situation  indicated  for that  year.  Theoreti-
cally,  the  support  price  should  be  set  at  a  level  which  permits
the supply to move freely into and out of the market if and when
production  rates  (yields)  are  normal.  However,  we  can  hardly
start  from  such  an  equilibrium  price  because  present  demand
and supply conditions may reflect  existing support programs  and
their  effects.  The only practical  assumption  is  that the year pre-
ceding  the  first  announcement  of  support  levels  did  supply  the
market  with  what  the  market  wanted;  to  assume  otherwise
would  make  the  transition  from  the  present  setup  to  the  new
one  extremely  difficult.
For  the  first  year,  then,  in which  the  program  is  in  effect,
support  prices  for commodities  presently  supported  will be  kept
at the same level.  For all commodities  which were  not supported
in  the  preceding  year,  the  support  price  will  be  at  the  level
which  actually  prevailed  during  the  preceding  year,  provided
they fall within the  60 to 90 percent range.  If actual  prices were
above 90 percent of parity, the support will be set at 90 percent;
and  if  actual  prices  were  below  60  percent,  support  prices  will
be set at 60 percent  of parity. This assumes that the  same quan-
tity will move  at the  same  price during the first year of the pro-
gram as moved during the year before  the program  started.  (We
recognize  that there  is an error in this statement.  For most com-
modities  demand  is  increasing,  particularly  due  to  population
growth.  On  the  other  hand,  yields  are  tending  to  increase.  An
underestimation  of  the  quantity  demanded  will  likely  be  auto-
matically  offset  by an  increase  in yields.)
The quantities  assumed to move  during the  year will  be con-
verted  to national  acreage  goals  in the  case of  crops  and  to na-
tional  number  goals  in  the  case  of  livestock.  In  converting  to
acreage,  the  average  yield  for  the  preceding  five  years  will  be
used.  This sets the stage for the future operation  of the program.
It is  necessary  to have acreage  or number  goals  computed  from
a  five-year  moving  average  to  get  away  from  abnormal  yields,
which are  to a large extent  beyond the farmer's  control.
In the second  and succeeding  years,  support  prices  and  acre-
age or number  goals  will  be  raised  or  lowered  depending  on  a
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farmers,  as  a group,  with  the announced  goals.  The second  one
stems from changes  in the five-year  yield average.  The third one
originates  from  changes  in  the  demand.  It  is  evident  that the
possible number  of cases  reflecting changes  in each  of  the three
"variable"  factors  is  rather large-27.  For  a quick  appraisal  of
how  the  program  actually  works,  we  shall  have  to  apply  the
usual procedure  of holding first one factor constant and then the
other,  etc.
Let us first assume,  then, that demand  will not change, while
farmers and  production  behave  in one of  the following  ways:
(1)  Farmers  stayed  within  the  specified  goals,  but  yield  is
above  normal  for  certain  crops  or livestock.  Support  prices  for
the next year will  not be  changed,  even  though  the government
has to buy part of the output. However,  the new acreage or num-
ber goals  may  be  lowered  since  the new  five-year  yield  average
now includes  last year's high yield.
(2)  Farmers  overplanted  or overbred  the goal,  while yields
stayed normal or were  above normal.  The support price  for the
second  year will  be lowered  by the same number  of percentage
points that  farmers overstepped  percentage-wise  the acreage  or
number  goals.  For example,  if the acreage  exceeded  the goal by
10  percent,  the support  price would  be dropped  10  points,  i.e.,
from  90  to  80  percent  of  parity  and  not by  10  percent  of  90,
which  would  give  an  81  percent support.
(3)  Farmers  underproduced  the  acreage  or  number  goal,
and yield  was  normal  or less.  The support price  for  the  second
year will be raised by the same number  of points as the percent-
age underplanting of the goal. However,  the support price would
not be  raised above  the  90 percent level.
(4)  Farmers  produced  the  specified  acreage  or  number  in
the first year,  but yield was  abnormally  low.  The support  price
in the second  year would remain at the same level  as during the
first. The acreage  goal would be adjusted upward, however, due
to a lower  five-year  moving average  yield.
Let  us  now  drop  the  assumption  of  constant  demand,  and
assume  that demand  will  increase  during  the  second  and  suc-
ceeding  years. Under this assumption of increased  demand, when
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havior,  the program  shapes  up  in the  following alternate  ways:
(1)  Farmers  exceeded  acreage  or number  goals  in the  first
year,  obtained normal yields,  but the increased output was  taken
by  the  market  at support  prices  because  of  the  increase  in de-
mand.  In that case,  the  acreage  or number goals  for  the second
year  will  be  computed  from  the quantity  taken  (or produced),
and  the support  price  will  remain  the  same.
(2)  Farmers  exceeded  the  acreage  goal  in the  first  year  by
more than demand  increased.  In this case  the support  price  will
be lowered  the same number of points  as  the percent production
exceeds  the amount  taken  by  consumers.
(3)  Producers  stayed  within  the  goals,  obtained  normal
yields,  but demand  pushed  the  actual  price  above  the  support
price.  The  acreage  goal  in  the  second  year  will  be  computed
from  total  production,  and  the  support  price  will  remain  un-
changed.
(4)  Producers  planted  less than the  goal  and, hence,  actual
price  was above  the  support price.  In the  second year,  the  acre-
age goal will be computed  from production in the first year,  and
the support  price  will  be  raised  by  the  same  number  of  points
that the goal is percentage-wise  underplanted,  provided  the sup-
port  price  is not  already  at 90  percent.
Now  let  us  assume  that  demand  decreases.  The  decreasing
demand  is taken into account in the second  and succeeding  years
by once  again basing  the  goal on  quantity  actually  taken in  the
first  year.  The  following  conditions  are  visualized:
(1)  Farmers  produced  the  requested  acreage  or  number,
and  yields  were  normal.  In  the  second  year  the  acreage  goal
would  be  computed  from  the  quantity  actually  taken  by  con-
sumers,  but the support  price  would not  be changed.  Of course,
it  is  likely  that  if  the  goal  were  continuously  reduced,  farmers
would  overplant.  Then,  they would  be  penalized  price-wise.
(2)  Farmers overplanted  the  goal.  In  this case,  the  goal  for
the second year is computed from the quantity consumers bought,
and the  support  price  is lowered  the  same  number  of  points  as
farmers  percentage-wise  overplanted  the  goal.
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production  equaled  the amount demanded  at  the price  support
prevailing  in the  first year.  In the  second  year,  the acreage  goal
will  be  computed  from  the  quantity  actually  produced  in  the
first year,  and the support  price will now be  lowered.
(4)  Farmers underproduced  the goal in the first  year to the
extent  that  prices  rose  above  the  support  level.  In  the  second
year  the  acreage  goal  will  be  computed  from  actual  produc-
tion, and  the support  price will be  raised,  if it is  below  90 per-
cent,  the same  number  of points  as the farmers percentage-wise
underplanted.
GENERAL  COMMENTS.  From  our sketch  of the various  ways
in which the proposed  program tries to adjust production  to de-
mand, the  following  features  and  issues may be  emphasized:
(1)  How  is  the  transition  made  from  the  present  support
system  to  the one  proposed?  For  prices  which  were  supported
in the year  preceding  the year in which  this program  is started,
prices  will  be  supported  for  the  first year  at the  prices actually
prevailing  during the  preceding  year,  not  to  exceed  90  percent
of parity.  Acreage  or number  goals will  be computed,  based  not
on total production  as  was  done  in the  case of crops not  receiv-
ing  supports,  but  on  production  actually  consumed  at  the  old
support price, i.e., total production minus government purchases.
In the succeeding  years,  support  prices  will  fluctuate  depending
on  farmers'  actions  and demand  as  for commodities  not being
supported when  the  program  starts.
(2)  Why  will  support  prices  be  raised  or  lowered  by  the
same number of parity points as farmers percentage-wise  deviate
from  the  goals?  Decreasing  the  support  by  one  full  percent  of
parity  for  each  one  percent overproduction  should  reduce  gross
income  slightly  and  have  a  greater  effect  on  net  income.  The
penalty  should  be  sufficient  to  cause  farmers  as  a  whole  to  re-
duce  planned  production  if  there  are  alternative  production
opportunities.  On the other hand,  changes  of the magnitude  in-
dicated  should  not  completely  unstabilize  prices  or production.
(3)  How is  the bothersome  question  of abnormally  high  or
abnormally low yields taken care of in the proposal?  Abnormally
high  yields  are  considered  only  insofar  as  they  enter  into  the
computations  of the five-year  moving  average.  For example,  let
81us  assume  as  we  did  above,  that  demand  increased  and  that
yields  were  substantially  above  normal.  In computing  the acre-
age goal  for the  following  year,  that part of  the overproduction
due to the abnormally high yield will  not be considered.  On the
other  hand,  low  yields  come  into  the  picture  in two  ways.  Of
course,  they  enter  into  the  five-year  average  yield  and,  hence,
tend to increase  the goal.  The goal for the next year is based  on
consumption  at the support  price or production  (and  consump-
tion),  whichever  is smaller.  When low  yields result  in a produc-
tion  below  the quantity  demanded  at  the  support  price,  actual
production  (which  was  also consumption)  becomes the goal  for
the  coming  year.  Also  in such  a  case  farmers  will not  be  penal-
ized  price-wise  even  though  they  had  overplanted  the  goal  in
the year in question.  On the  other hand, support  prices  will not
be raised  when  production  is  below  the quantity  demanded  be-
cause  yields  are  abnormally  low.
(4)  Why  are  goals  not  increased  in  cases  where  demand
outstrips  production,  and  prices  rise  above  the  support  levels?
In order to raise the goals with any degree of precision,  we  would
need  to  estimate  fairly  closely  elasticities  and  schedules  of  de-
mand.  We do not have this information. That leaves the alterna-
tive of  not  announcing  any goal  and  leaving  the  support  price
where  it  was  or  raising  the  goal.  It  does  not  seem  desirable,
however,  to  omit  goals  completely.  This  leaves  the  alternative
of adhering to the consumption of the preceding year as the goal
for the  next year,  and  this is  the one  we  chose.  Of  course,  we
anticipate  that  the  above-support  prices  actually  received  will
stimulate  production.  But  we  do  not  translate  this  anticipation
into goals  for fear that farmers would find these  goals unrealistic
and that they would  be  conducive  to overproduction.
SEASONAL  AND REGIONAL  ADJUSTMENTS  OF PRICE SUPPORTS.
The support  prices will be adjusted  seasonally.  They will be ad-
justed  to the same pattern  that has  prevailed  over  the  five  pre-
ceding  years.  The  support  price will  be  adjusted  up  and  down
the same percent  as monthly prices vary from the yearly average
price.  In Table 2, the five-year  average price by months, percent
variation  from  the yearly  average,  and  monthly  support  prices
are  indicated  for  eggs  and  potatoes.
Adjusting  support  prices  seasonally  has  several  advantages.
In the first  place,  it is  believed  that the quantity  of the product
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ing normal peak production seasons  would be smaller.  Purchases
during slack production seasons  should be slight.  Higher support
prices  in months  of  slack  production  should  encourage  farmers
to  "even  out"  production  of  items  such  as  eggs  and  milk,  and
this should be  in the interest  of the consumer,  and to the extent
that consumption  is  encouraged,  should  result in better  market-
ing  and  less  government  purchases.  Finally,  when  there  is  an
overproduction,  government  purchases  should  be  distributed
throughout the year,  reducing the need for storage facilities and
making disposition easier.
Support  prices  will  not be adjusted  by regions.  To some  ex-
tent  the  seasonal  adjustment  will  result  in  different  support
prices for different  regions. This is  particularly  true of commod-
ities  such  as  fresh  vegetables  and  fruit.  A  nation-wide  support
price  should  encourage  shifts  in  production  to  those  regions
which  can  produce  the  commodity  most  efficiently.
WHEN  THE  SUPPORT  YEAR  BEGINS.  A  given  support  price
will be  in effect  for a year.  The  support  year will  correspond  to
the production  marketing  year  for  each  crop.  For example,  the
support price for the  1953 corn crop  would become  effective  on
September  1, 1953,  and  continue  in effect through August  1954.
In the  case of potatoes,  the support year  would  begin just prior
to the marketing  season for late  potatoes,  which comprise  about
three-fourths  of the crop.  In the case of items produced through-
out  the  year,  the  support  year  should  begin  just  prior  to  the
month  in  which  the  seasonal  low  usually  prevails.  There  is  a
real  problem  in  the  case  of  hogs  and  cattle,  which  while  pro-
duced  throughout  the year  from  a  national  point  of  view,  are
sold only at specified  times by individual farmers.  It is suggested,
without much  logical  basis,  that  the support  year  for  hogs  and
cattle begin  September  1.
Two  EXAMPLES  FOR  THE  ACTUAL  OPERATION  OF  THE  PRO-
GRAM.  Potatoes  and milk are  used as examples  to show how the
program will  work.  In both problems  it is  assumed  that  1953  is
the first year of the support program and that  1954  is the second
year. Potato prices were  not supported in  1952 while milk prices
were.
(1)  Potatoes. In this example  it is assumed  that the support
year starts  on January  1 so that published statistics  can be  used.
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The  following  information  is  needed  to  determine  the  sup-
port price  for  1953:
Price  as percent  of parity for  1952,  which  is  132.
Production  in  1952,  which  is  374,504,000  bushels.
Average  yield  per  acre  1948-52,  which is  239  bushels.
As  price  in  1952  was  above 90  percent  of parity,  prices  will
be  supported  at  90 percent  of  parity  in  1953.  (See  Table  2 for
monthly  support  prices.)  The  acreage  goal  will  be  1,567,000
acres,  which  is  determined  by  dividing  the  five-year  yield  into
1952  production.
The manner  in which the program  will  work in  1954  under
a majority of the supply  and  demand -situations that could  exist
is shown  in Table 3.
(2)  Milk. In  this example,  it  is  assumed  that  the  base  year
includes  April  1952  through  March  1953.  (Milk  prices  were
supported in  1952-53.)  The  following  information  is  needed  to
determine  the  support price  for  the year ending  March  1954.
Price as percent of parity during base year  over 90 percent
Production  during  base  year  117.5  billion  pounds
Government  purchases during base year  7.4  billion  pounds
Consumption  at or above support price  110.1  billion  pounds
Average  production  per cow  last five  years  5,326  pounds
Number  of  cows milked  during year  21,553,000
In  the year  beginning  April  1953  and  ending  March  1954,
prices  will  be  supported  at  90  percent  of parity.  The  goal  will
be  20,672,00  milk  cows,  which  is  determined  by  dividing  the
average  five-year  production  into  110.1  billion  pounds,  the
amount  taken  at  the  support  price  in  1952.
The  manner  in  which  the  program  will  work  in  the  year
ending March  1955 under some of the supply and demand situa-
tions  which  could  exist is  shown in  Table  4.  Many  of  the  pos-
sible  combinations  arising  from  production  above  and  below
normal  that  were included  in the  potato  example  are  excluded
because  exactly  the  same  principles  apply.
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When  a  depression  hits,  all  price  supports  will  be  frozen  at
the  levels,  as  expressed  in terms  of the  parity  price,  which  pre-
vailed  before  the  depression.  For  the  purpose  of  determining
exactly  when  depression  conditions  exist,  some  economic  indi-
cator  must  be  selected.  We  chose  the  level  of  employment  for
the purpose  of this paper.  A depression  exists when  the  level  of
employment  falls off by  10 percent from  the average  of the past
five years.  Other indicators,  or  a combination  of indicators,  may
be used,  of course.
The freezing  of price-support  levels  at the predepression  par-
ity  scale  assumes  that  the  depression  will  last  only  a  few  years
and that the pattern of consumer  demand  will  re-establish  itself
in the  old  way once  the depression  is  over.  In other  words,  it is
assumed  that  a  depression  is  really  abnormal,  and  that it  is  de-
sirable  to  maintain  the  predepression  composition  of  the  total
agricultural  output  as  well  as  the  established  pattern  of  price
differentials between  agricultural  products.  If these assumptions,
or  objectives,  are  not  acceptable,  some  change  in  the proposal
seems warranted.
The  freezing  of price-support  levels  does  not  mean  that  the
same absolute  support prices  will prevail  throughout  the  depres-
sion.  Since  support  prices  are  expressed  in  terms  of  the  parity
prices,  they must change  as the index of  prices  paid by  farmers
changes.  Our experiences  show that the index  of prices  paid  by
farmers  moves down much more  slowly than the  index of prices
received.
Method of Attaining  Support  Prices
(1)  Regardless  of  whether  full  employment  or  depression
conditions  prevail,  prices  will  be  supported  by  the  government
by purchases  in the  market  place.
Government  purchases  are  used to support  prices  for  several
reasons.  First,  with  an  inelastic  demand  the  cost  to the  govern-
ment will be lower than under any alternative  method. The  cost
of  compensatory  payments  to  the  government,  for  example,
would be prohibitive.  Second,  with highly perishable  items there
is  no  practical  alternative  to outright  purchases.  Third,  a  well
designed  government  purchase  program  can  encourage  better
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reduce  the need for price supports.2
The  government  will  dispose  of its  purchases  in  the  follow-
ing  ways:
(a)  By  giving  commodities  to  the  school  lunch  program,
prisons,  and  organized  welfare  groups.
(b)  Through foreign  aid programs  such as  feeding starving
East  Germans.  Commodities  going  to  foreign  countries  should
not  be  "dumped"  but  should  be  used  in  a  manner  that  helps
carry  out  the  over-all  foreign  policy.
(c)  By  stockpiling.  Stockpiling  is  interpreted  as  storing  in
the  national  interest.  It  is  often  assumed  that  perishable  prod-
ucts  cannot  be  stored.  Yet  practically  all  so-called  perishable
products  can be made  storable through  some kind of processing.
(d)  By selling on the world market at a price below the pur-
chase  price.  Dumping  should  not  be  practiced,  but  it may  be
possible to work out agreements  for  several  commodities  similar
to the  International  Wheat  Agreement.
(e)  By  selling  domestically.  Products  cannot  be  sold  below
purchase  price  plus  any  costs  incurred  by  the  government  in
handling  the product.  Such  a  provision  is  necessary  to  prevent
individuals from selling to the government and buying back later
at a lower price.
(f)  By  diverting  products  to  secondary  uses.  An  example
is diverting peanuts  to oil. Products can be  diverted to secondary
uses  only  when  the  secondary  product  is  selling  above  support
prices.
(g)  By destruction.  Undoubtedly  some products  must be de-
stroyed.  A public relations program  showing  the  nature of  agri-
cultural  supply  and  demand  and  the  small  cost  of  insuring
abundant  food  and  fiber  wvill  be  necessary  to  make  destruction
acceptable  to  the  public.  Also,  the  public  should  realize  that
considerable  destruction  takes  place  when  there  is  an  over-
production  of  perishable  products  and  there  is  no  support  pro-
gram.  The real questions  are whether  the government's  bearing
2Several  examples  of  government  purchases  improving  marketing  and,  hence,
consumption are given in the  report prepared for  the 82nd  Congress called  "Price  Sup-
ports  for Perishable  Products  ..  A  Review  of  Experience."
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whether  its  purchasing  the  overproduction  will  result  in  more
or less destruction.  It is quite possible that the government's pur-
chasing  a  share  of  the crop  will  result  in less  total  destruction,
as  the government has more  means  for  disposing  of the  surplus
than  the  individual  producer  or  private  purchaser.  Over  the
long  run the public  must  pay for  the destruction,  regardless  of
whether  the destruction be carried out by producers,  purchasers,
or the government.
(2)  When  the price  of  a particular  commodity  drops  to  75
percent  of  the  parity  price,  farmers  may  vote  for  production
controls.  The  question  can  be raised  as  to why production  con-
trols  are  employed.  Why  not  let  flexible  supports  handle  the
allocative  job?  We  feel  that  production  controls  are  necessary
and desirable  under some  conditions.
When  there  is  general  overproduction,  and  not  just  over-
production of a few commodities,  low prices  do not  restrict  out-
put in a reasonable  period of years.  There is even indication  that
farmers  increase output when prices fall in an effort  to maintain
income.  In the long  run farm production  would  decrease  due to
low prices.  In  the  meantime  the  agricultural  plant  would  de-
teriorate,  and farm people would suffer low incomes.  We suggest
that these  conditions are not in the public interest.
Even if farmers are  willing to adjust  production to changing
prices,  several  years  may  be  required  to make  the  adjustment.
Farmers  cannot  even  restrict  production,  in  the  same  sense  as
industry, within a production  period. The addition of new enter-
prises  may  require years.
Production  controls  would  take  the  form  of  restricting  the
sales  volume  of  each  farmer  producing  that  commodity,  and
would not be converted into  acreage  allotments.  In other words,
farm marketing  quotas would  be established  in terms  of bushels
or pounds,  and  not in terms  of  acreages  or numbers.  The  farm
quotas  will  be  figured  from  the  national  marketing  quota  by
breaking this over-all figure down by states,  counties,  and farms.
Individual  farm  marketing  quotas  will  be  established  on  the
basis of the average  production  of the farm  during the last  five
years.
Marketing  quotas  have  several  advantages  over  acreage  or
number  allotments.  First,  it  is  the  only  way  to  really  control
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der other methods.  Each producer will be given tickets indicating
the quantity  that  can  be  sold.  The  tickets  will  be  collected  by
the person  to whom the  farmer  sells.  When  the farmer  disposes
of  all  his  tickets,  he  can  market  no  more  unless  tickets  can  be
purchased  from  another  producer.  Third,  marketing  quotas
would  not be  capitalized  into  land values  to the  same  extent  as
acreage  allotments. Fourth, marketing  quotas would permit pro-
ducers  more  nearly  to  attain  the  optimum  farm  organization
than  would  acreage  allotments.  Fifth,  by  determining  quotas
for the individual unit on the basis of production for the past five
years,  farmers who have been obtaining high yields receive credit
for their  efforts,  knowledge,  and  comparative  advantage.
The  procedure  for  establishing  marketing  quotas  is  the  fa-
miliar  one  of  having  the  Secretary  of  Agriculture  call  for  a
referendum  when  prices  drop  to  the  75  percent  level.  However,
farmers  will  vote for  the marketing  quotas for  one year only.
When  farmers  vote,  they will  have  several  alternatives  from
which to  choose.  They can  vote  against controls.  in which  case
support  prices  may  follow the  formula  until  they reach  60  per-
cent of parity.  On the other hand, they can  vote  to  restrict  pro-
duction to a level which should bring prices  (and the government
will guarantee  farmers  getting these  prices)  to either  75,  80,  85,
or 90 percent  of  parity.  Discretion  will  have  to  be  used  by  the
government in determining the levels of production which should
bring  prices  to  the  desired  level.  A  reasonable  excess  (5  to  10
percent)  of  expected  actual  consumption  at  the  stated  price
must be included in the quota to protect consumers in case of low
yields.  The  excess  is  particularly  important  in  this  program  as
it is assumed that individual farm marketing  quotas will  actually
control  production,  whereas  acreage  allotments  will not  strictly
control  production.
Marketing  quotas will  be made  transferable.  Making  quotas
salable  has  several  advantages  over  not allowing  the  quota  or
allotment  to be sold.  First, such  a procedure  enables  those  indi-
viduals  and areas  which  have  lower  than normal production  to
realize  additional  income.  Of course,  a producer  would  not  de-
liberately underproduce  unless  he intended to go out of produc-
tion,  as the small  production  would  tend to lower  the quota  for
the  farm  in  succeeding  years.  Second,  making  quotas  salable
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duce  the product  most efficiently.  Marginal  producers  could sell
the quotas,  realize some income  from them,  and either move out
of agriculture or begin producing other products.  Those farmers
purchasing quotas would tend to get larger quotas in succeeding
years,  while  those selling would  get less.
The actual sale of marketing  quotas or parts of quotas should
not  prove  difficult.  The  government  could  set  a  price,  as it did
for  cotton gin  tickets  in the thirties,  or the market  could  be  al-
lowed  to  set  the  price.  The  authors  favor  the  latter system.  Of
course,  a record  must be kept of  those  who buy and  sell to help
determine  quotas  in future  years;  the  name  and  address  of  the
seller should appear on the tickets;  and the buyer should be held
responsible  for  recording  the transaction.
APPRAISAL  OF  THE  PROGRAM
In  making  an  appraisal,  some  yardstick  must  be  used.  The
yardstick in this case will be eight criteria which have been used
by  several  individuals  who  have  appraised  price-support  pro-
grams.  The  eight criteria  are:
1. Provide reasonable  price  stability  for the commodity  and
help  maintain  over-all  economic  stability.
2.  Maintain supply in line with demand within a reasonable
range  of short-run  price  fluctuations  and  over time.
3.  Encourage  efficient  production  and marketing.
4.  Encourage  capital and labor resources to shift to employ-
ment which  gives  higher returns.
5.  Encourage  resource conservation.
6.  Be  politically acceptable  and administratively  feasible.
7.  Be consistent  with  other policies of the nation.
8.  Provide  for distribution  of costs  and  benefits  in line  with
public welfare goals.
It should be  recognized  that the  proposed  program will not
satisfactorily meet all of the criteria. The real question  is whether
the proposed program more nearly meets the criteria than alter-
natives,  including  "no program."
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(1)  PROVIDE  REASONABLE  PRICE  STABILITY  FOR  THE  COM-
MODITY  AND HELP  MAINTAIN  OVER-ALL  STABILITY.  The program
provides  reasonable  price  stability.  When compared  with  a  free
market,  the  proposal  provides  considerable  stability  as  fluctua-
tions  of as  much  as  50  percent  are  not  uncommon  in  the  free
market.  Production  has  varied  much  less  than  price,  which  is
the  consequence  of  an  inelastic  demand.  As  the  level  of  price
support is  tied to production,  the support  price  will seldom  vary
as much  as  10  percent.  Complete  price  stability would  conflict
with  several  other  criteria,  particularly  numbers  4  and  8.
The proposal  should contribute to over-all economic  stability
in  several  ways.  When  the  general  price  level  is  declining  and
unemployment  increases,  government  payments  would  increase,
which  would  help  to stabilize  the  general  price  level.  It  is  rec-
ognized  that  payments  to  farmers  will  not  provide  the  same
boost  to the  general price  level  as  payments  in  some  other  seg-
ments  of the economy,  but the payments  will help.  Raising  sup-
port prices when production  is low should encourage  production.
An  increase  in production  is  particularly  effective  in  preventing
price increases  when the demand  is inelastic.
(2)  MAINTAIN  SUPPLY  IN  LINE  WITH  DEMAND  WITHIN  A
REASONABLE  RANGE  OF  SHORT-RANGE  PRICE  FLUCTUATIONS
AND  OVER  TIME.  It is  recognized  that  supply  will  always  come
in  line  with demand  at  some  price.  With  an  inelastic  demand
the price can vary widely, however.  The question  is whether the
program  will,  with  the exception  of variations  in  supply  due  to
factors  beyond  the  farmer's  control,  keep  supply  in  line  with
demand within  a  reasonable  price  range.  The  program will not
insure production  being in line with  demand in a given  year.  It
is  doubtful  if  any  pricing  plan  will  accomplish  such  a  goal  in
the short run even if unforeseen variations in supply are excluded.
The  supply function  is simply too  complicated  and too  inelastic.
Demand can  also change  in an unpredicted  direction  and  at an
unpredicted  rate.  With  considerable  time  being  necessary  to
change  supply,  price  is  likely to vary due  to the demand factor.
The  proposal,  particularly  with  the  production  control  provi-
sions,  should  maintain  supply  in  line  with  demand  within  a
reasonable  price range. Certainly the cost of maintaining  reason-
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proposals,  and  particularly  fixed  high-level  supports.
In the long run the proposal should do a reasonably  good job
of adjusting  supply to demand at a  reasonable, price.  The  60 to
90 percent  of  parity  range  should be  sufficient,  if price has  any
influence  on production,  either to decrease  or increase  supply  to
meet  the changing demand.
(3)  ENCOURAGE  EFFICIENT  PRODUCTION  AND  MARKETING.
The  proposal  reduces  uncertainty,  which  should  lead  to  more
efficient production. On many farms additional capital is needed.
The  reduction  in  uncertainty  plus  the  increase  in  income  de-
rived  from the program  should  encourage  investment.  The  flex-
ible supports  should  also help  farmers  to  arrive at the optimum
product combination.  The  government could materially  improve
marketing  through its purchase program.
On the other hand, the marketing quotas may reduce  the in-
centive  for  higher  per  unit  yields.  Also  the  marketing  quotas
may  tend  at  times  to  prevent  farmers  from  changing  produc-
tion plans. They will not provide as much of a "brake"  on shift-
ing  production  as acreage  allotments.
(4)  ENCOURAGE  CAPITAL  AND  LABOR  TO  SHIFT  TO  EMPLOY-
MENT WHICH  GIVES  HIGHER RETURNS.  As previously  indicated,
the proposal  should encourage  the addition  of capital.  On  most
farms capital  earns higher returns  than alternative  investments.
The program should help move labor out of agriculture to higher
paying  employment.  If  the  quantity  of  production  which  is
needed  is known and prices stabilized,  farm labor can  effectively
compare  earnings  in  agriculture  with  alternative  employments.
A  relatively  stable  situation  should  also  encourage  an  orderly
shift of  labor out  of  agriculture,  which  is  desirable.  It must  be
remembered  that  a  desperate  situation  is  not  compatible  with
moving  labor out  of  agriculture.  A bankrupt  man  cannot  shift
without  some  kind  of  direct  assistance.
(5)  ENCOURAGE  RESOURCE  CONSERVATION.  The  proposal
will  encourage  conservation  in at  least  three  ways:  (a)  uncer-
tainty  will  be  reduced,  (b)  farm  income  will  likely  be  higher
than it would be  if there were  no supports,  and  (c)  the adjust-
ments  should  be  more  orderly  than  under  free  prices.
The  proposal would  in no way  discourage  conservation.
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FEASIBLE.  While  the  program  will be  difficult  to  administer,  it
should be no more difficult  for  a particular  commodity than the
present  program.  Of course,  as all  commodities  are included  in
the proposal,  the administrative  job will be larger.  The  proposal
should  not  be  as  difficult  from  an  administrative  standpoint  as
the  Brannan  Plan  and  other  programs  involving  compensatory
payments.
Several  parts  of  the  program  are  not  readily  acceptable.
There is some question as to whether farmers will accept  flexible
supports.  This  is  particularly  true  if  the  so-called  "basics"  are
included  in the  proposal.  The  consumer  would  probably  prefer
no support  program.  The  consumer  does  not like  destruction  of
food and  fiber,  and destruction  is involved  in the proposal.
(7)  BE  CONSISTENT  WITH OTHER POLICIES  OF THE  NATION.
No  proposal  can  be  consistent  with  all other  policies,  for  many
of them  are  inconsistent.  The  proposal  does  contribute  to  over-
all economic  stability.  It provides some  security for  farmers and,
hence,  is  consistent with  the  over-all  policy of providing  reason-
able security  to everyone.  To the extent that farmers are  a  low-
income  group,  it  is  consistent  with  the  policy  of  equalizing
incomes.  The  proposed  program  could  help  implement  our
foreign  policies.
It is inconsistent with the goal  of maximum freedom  for the
individual and, to some extent,  with  the goal  of promoting freer
world trade,  but  is superior to many alternatives  in this  respect.
(8)  PROVIDE  FOR  DISTRIBUTION  OF  COSTS  AND  BENEFITS  IN
LINE  WITH  PUBLIC  WELFARE  GOALS.  The  proposal  will  un-
doubtedly  entail  cost  to  the  government.  In  some  years,  even
when  there  is  not  a depression,  the  cost will  be  high.  The  cost
to  the government  could  well  be  greater  than  has  been  experi-
enced  to date. Yet the cost is not likely to be  as high as the pres-
ent program  would be  if it included  all commodities.  If depres-
sion  years  are  excluded,  over  a  period  of  time,  the  cost  should
not be higher than the cost of  the present  program.
92TABLE  1.  ACTUAL  PRICE  (SEASON  AVERAGE)  AS  PERCENT
OF  EFFECTIVE  PARITY  PRICE
(Current Formula  for Each  Year)







Tobacco,  types  11-14
DESIGNATED  NONBASICS
Potatoes
Butterfat,  in cream
All  milk, wholesale
Honey,  comb
OTHERS:





























111.5  97.6  94.4  129.3  112.0  91.3
112.8  89.6  86.6  90.5  87.2  84.2
142.1  80.6  80.0  93.3  96.6  83.3
90.1  87.5  88.9  90.8  79.4  82.9
92.8  101.6  100.0  109.4  93.1  92.3
101.3  83.6  69.4  51.0  89.4  132.0
117.1  113.3  91.0  98.3  93.2  92.5
114.5  113.8  91.4  101.3  100.0  98.3
115.6  95.6  88.4  100.0  91.9
160.9  166.9  141.0  179.2  159.4  115.6
145.2  128.3  101.1  103.4  100.5  94.5
81.8  74.7  70.3  70.3  89.7  96.4
104.4  115.8  94.3  90.9  89.7  83.6
108.0  132.6  101.2  94.8  97.9  85.4
141.7  147.9  135.9  162.3  158.4  109.8
85.2  83.0  69.3  63.2  73.5  93.6
84.9  83.6  75.1  78.2  83.9  103.4
150.2  88.9  93.2  79.2  118.3  137.4
140.3  103.1  95.5  90.4  85.2  100.8
136.9  117.1  137.5  101.1  89.0  92.1
132.3  76.4  86.0  53.4  84.4  132.4
80.6  69.7  68.4  71.3  70.7  74.6
121.9  86.2  86.2  78.5  90.2  110.5
109.4  94.1  101.2  116.0  107.7  109.2
115.5  104.6  95.4  112.1  101.2  110.7
16.9  31.3  81.9  45.4  29.2  45.0
27.5  38.6  53.3  44.6  27.9  41.3
81.0  92.1  58.7  60.0  61.9  100.0
100.0  80.0  83.3  112.0  110.6  71.9
72.1  80.6  62.7  92.4  78.6  80.9
79.9  84.7  108.3  117.4  71.7  58.7
142.1  133.1  122.7  122.5  77.3  86.2
111.1  94.2  99.0  91.9  88.4  94.7
94.3  73.6  81.7  100.0  79.7  96.2
93TABLE  2.  MONTHLY  PRICES,  PERCENT  VARIATION  FROM  YEARLY  PRICE,
AND  SUPPORT  PRICE  AS  PERCENT  OF  PARITY  FOR  1953
Eggs  Potatoes
Month  Average  Percent  Support  Average  ercent  Support
Averagice  Variation  ort  Average  Variation  Price
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